This paper discusses some puzzles in the contemporary macroeconomic scene in India, from the perspective of public finance and economic development. These include a fiscal deficit higher than it was during the 1991 crisis, but without a large current account deficit or rise in inflation or interest rates, a rising inflow of external capital, accompanied by the RBI's sterilizing these inflows and accumulating large reserves, even in the face of low inflation. We offer a critique of some previous analyses, and some models that are suggestive of how real and monetary factors might be integrated in providing a firmer grounding for the policy debates current in India.
exchange reserves) also fell from 10.2% (365.4%) to 2.8% (5.4%) (RBI 2004, Tables 2.5, 7.12 and 7.14). The stock of reserves, which had hovered just about $1 billion (less than two weeks worth of imports) between April and August of 1991 during the crisis, began its steady climb soon after. The rate of accumulation accelerated since 1999-2000, and the stock reached $119 billion in early May 2004.
Third, the balance of payments on the current account has been in surplus, though by a small amount (less than 0.5% of GDP) for three years in succession starting in 2001-02. Fourth, annual growth rate of real GDP, having peaked at 7.8% in 1996-97, has slowed down and fluctuated since then. It reached a low of 4.0% in the severe drought year of 2002-03 ('quick estimates'). The good monsoon in 2004 has led to a recovery and the advance estimate of the growth rate is 8.1% (CSO 2004) . Even if an 8.1% growth rate is reached, a simple average growth rate during 1997-98 to 2003-04 will only be 5.6%, as compared to an average of 6.7% during the first five years (1992-93 -1997-98 ) after reforms were initiated. However, gross capital formation as a proportion of GDP in current (constant) prices averaged 24.8% (25.0%) in the first period and 23.8% (25.9%) in the second period. Thus, although real capital formation on an average was higher by nearly 2% in the second period, average growth was slower. Fifth, inflation rates, as measured by any of the price indices, have been low since the mid-nineties and so have interest rates.
Prima facie, these facts are puzzling. First, although the GFD is even higher than it was during the 1991 crisis, it has not been associated, as it was then, with a large current account deficit or rise in inflation or interest rates. Second, although some external credit rating agencies have downgraded Indian debt instruments to near junk bond status, such downgrading and the high fiscal deficit seem to have had little effect on the confidence of external investors; the inflow of external capital has been rising.
Third, running a current account surplus does not make sense since, as a developing country, presumably with opportunities for high yielding investments, India should be running a current account deficit financed by sustained capital inflows. Fourth, the RBI has been sterilizing foreign capital inflows and accumulating reserves to levels that prima facie appear too large relative to what would be needed to smooth shocks to export earnings and import expenditures and to provide (self) insurance against possible financial crisis, given that capital controls continue. 1 Since inflation has been low by historical standards, sterilization for the purpose of containing inflationary pressures is not convincing. It is hard to say the rupee will appreciate to such an extent as to hurt exports in the short and medium run and to raise trade deficits. The fact that part of the reserves accumulated have been used to prepay debt suggests that the policy makers cannot see ways of investing these resources in the economy so as to earn a return higher than the rate of interest on debt.
2 Fifth, reduction in financial repression and freeing of interest rates apparently have had little effect on household financial saving, which rose marginally from a simple average of 10.2% of GDP at current prices during 1992-93 -1996-97 to 10.8% during 1997-98 to 2002-03, while direct saving in the form of physical assets rose significantly from 8% of GDP to 10.7% during the same period. Given household savings are estimated as residuals and fluctuate quite a bit, we do not wish to overemphasize these differences. Still, it is a bit odd that savings in the 1 An informal case for reserve accumulation based on self-insurance motives and for its signaling role is provided by Kapur and Patel (2003) . Joshi and Sanyal (2004) appear to support this view, though they explicitly state that the reserves to imports ratio is now high enough (based on a rule of thumb argument) and should not be further increased. 2 Joshi and Sanyal (2004, p. 34) implicitly assume something similar, when they state, "policymakers must urgently consider how to utilize the continuing inflows productively."
form of physical assets went up and financial savings did not after the freeing of interest rates or deposits.
The recent literature has focused largely on three issues. The first is whether or not the current level of public debt is sustainable without a major fiscal correction, and the related one of apparent lack of signs of a looming financial crisis in spite of India's macroeconomic indicators being, in fact, similar to or worse than in those countries which did experience a crisis. The second is whether or not more productive private investment was crowded out by fiscal deficits.
The third is whether instead of sterilizing external capital inflows and accumulating reserves, had the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) let the inflows be absorbed and rupee appreciate, would the growth rate of the economy have been significantly higher in the last few years. On the first issue, several papers were presented at a conference (January 15-16, 2004) consumer demand for money even in a very simple transactions-demand form makes a difference in determining how the decision to let real external flows be absorbed or not affects relative prices and inflation. We also argue below that sterilization is not equivalent to nonabsorption.
As we state in our paper (Singh and Srinivasan, 2004) for the NIPF-IMF conference, which drew upon other papers of the conference, one needs a coherent intertemporal model that incorporates the real and monetary sectors of the economy and that fits Indian data well for analyzing the puzzles noted above. No such model is available in the literature, nor did we provide one in our paper. Nevertheless, we argued that the facts are consistent with the climate for private corporate investment having worsened since 1996-97. Thus, a rise in the fiscal deficit and fall in interest rates and inflation are consistent with a rise in foreign capital inflow, unchanged or even a rise in household financial saving, and a fall in private investment. In this paper we develop some formal intertemporal models that begin to provide a coherent framework.
A limitation remains in that we do not incorporate money into these intertemporal models:
nevertheless, growth, investment and deficit issues can be more clearly analyzed along the lines that we present, than in past discussions of India's macroeconomic situation.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we re-examine the sterilization and absorption issues raised by LBP, in a more clearly specified monetary model, albeit a static one.
In Section 3, we present several illustrative theoretical models, which examine growth, deficits and investment, without the complication of money. Section 4 concludes. We also discuss some additional analytical and empirical issues arising from the LBP paper, in Appendix 1.
Note that the models we present here may be helpful as coherent analytical foundations for a future econometric exercise. However, we should hasten to add that these models are very simple, and even simplistic, and address analytically only some, and not all, of the relevant issues. Our intention in presenting them is to encourage others to attempt building and estimating more satisfactory and complete models. Finally, many of our criticisms of LBP are applicable to much of the literature on the issues of crowding out, inflation and exchange rate effects of fiscal deficits and capital inflows. But these criticisms should in no way be deemed as our lack of appreciation of the LBP paper, particularly its section on policy implications, which we found to be very rich and informative.
Absorption, Sterilization and Crowding Out
We noted earlier that the real and monetary models of LBP are not integrated, and the decisions of consumers regarding the demand for money and other nominal assets have no influence on their real consumption decisions. We show here that incorporating consumer demand for money makes a difference in determining the impacts on relative prices and inflation, of the decision to let real external flows be absorbed or not. We also argue that sterilization is not equivalent to non-absorption: the former is neutralizing the monetary impact of foreign capital inflows, and the latter is preventing their impact on real flows of goods.
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Our model with an explicit demand for money is based on a simple static version of the Australian dependent economy model used by LBP. It has three goods, an import good, an export good, and a non-traded good. The demand for money is determined as a proportional transaction demand, and is therefore tied to the real economy, as one would expect. 7 There is no bond market, so sterilization of foreign inflows by selling bonds is not an option in this model.
Indeed, this structure emphasizes our distinction between sterilization and non-absorption. We discuss sterilization separately, after analyzing the formal model. 6 We make this point in the context of our behavioral model -a different point underlies Joshi and Sanyal's (2004) accounting-based critique of LBP's analysis of the growth costs of reserve accumulation. They note that sterilization over the period analyzed was far from complete, and that "Capital and remittance inflows were absorbed, except to the extent of (sterilized) foreign exchange accumulation." (p. 11) However, Joshi and Sanyal's treatment of monetary policy responses to inflows gets closer to our argument. See also the discussion in our Appendix 1. 7 This is just one way in which money demand can be modeled. Two standard alternatives are to put money in the utility function, and to impose a cash-in-advance constraint. For example, van Wijnbergen (1991) uses the former strategy, in a model with a single consumption good, domestic money, and foreign bonds. There is no trade in real goods, and openness just impacts intertemporal consumption through borrowing and saving decisions. As an example of the latter approach, Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2001) A: Government buys the dollar gift from the private sector at the going exchange rate , with newly created money, and adds dollars to its reserves (in other words, G is not absorbed).
The private sector uses dollars to buy import good, i.e., G is absorbed. G In Case A, the money supply M in the economy goes up by eG and the dollars to buy imports are generated by sale of exports. In Case B, money supply remains at its pre-gift level M , but the finance for imports goes up by G dollars over export earnings. The market equilibrium conditions in the two cases (i = A, B)
Market for imports , ;
where 0
Now, including its expenditure on acquisition of money, the total expenditure of the private sector (for simplicity, there is no taxing or spending by the government) is ( : Resources available for financing this expenditure is the sum of initial money stock
income from sales of the output of the export and non-trade goods (as well as the gift G ).
Equating total expenditure with resources available for financing it we get:
Since is also the expenditure on the imported and non-traded good, we get:
Equations (2.8), (2.9), and (2.5) imply (2.6). This is nothing but Walras Law. Thus, we need only two market equilibrium conditions, say (2.4) and (2.5).
Consider Case A. Denote N e p , the real exchange rate, i.e., the relative price of either traded good in terms of the non-traded goods as e . Denote the real expenditure
Then from (2.5) we have
(imports are normal goods) and 0
From (2.2) and (2.4) we get:
Denoting RA M as real money stock and E RA as real expenditure (both in terms of nontraded goods), we get
Dividing both sides of (2.8A) by N p we get: Note that neither depends on G since in Case A, the gift G is not absorbed.
Using these in (2.14), we solve for the equilibrium real money stock
The nominal prices in equilibrium then follow as: Since the gift G adds to the supply of imports as well as to the total expenditure of imports and non-traded goods, it has both a substitution effect in domestic production towards non-traded goods and real expenditure effects. Naturally, the full impact on the equilibrium real exchange rate e and real expenditure on would depend on various demand and supply elasticities as well as the size of the gift . From (2.5
absolute value of the elasticity of demand for imports with respect to e . Clearly, it is positive. This can be assumed to be positive.
elasticity of equilibrium real exchange rate with respect to . Its sign is to be determined in equilibrium.
elasticity of equilibrium real expenditure with respect to . Its sign is to be determined in equilibrium. Rewrite (2.18) as: 
Using (2.5 and (2.8 in (2.22), we get:
Substituting for η from (2.23) in (2.18 )′ , we get:
Clearly if 1 β < and α β > , then 0 δ < . Thus, if the demand for imports is inelastic with respect for real expenditure and the price elasticity of import demand exceeds its real expenditure elasticity, then 0 δ < or the real exchange rate appreciates as the gift G is absorbed. On the other hand, if α > Max (1, β ), it follows from (2.23) that 0 η > but the sign of δ is ambiguous.
Thus, unlike the case of no absorption of the gift in which the gift has only an inflationary effect, full absorption of the gift has ambiguous real (and also nominal) effects in general. The precise effect becomes an empirical issue, depending on the magnitude of various demand elasticities.
Thus we have shown that incorporating money into the real Australian model, even in a static framework, changes some aspects of the analysis significantly. The real and nominal aspects of the economy cannot first be analyzed in isolation and then combined ex post.
Turning to the nature of sterilization and its impact on crowding out, note that LBP compare monetization of fiscal deficits with sterilization of capital inflows, and claim that "as with capital inflow that is sterilized, a fiscal deficit that is not monetized will leave the real exchange rate unchanged, but reduce investment, the growth of the capital stock, and the growth rate" (LBP 2003, p. 4967) . This is misleading. An exogenous foreign gift adds to the resources available to the economy. Sterilization is equivalent to two operations by the RBI: first, it purchases the gift with money creation, and then it absorbs the newly created money through the sale of government securities it owns. 10 Sterilization thus affects the composition of the RBI's balance sheet (i.e., it swaps its domestic assets in the form of government securities for foreign assets of equal value). Government securities are liabilities of the government regardless of whether they are held by RBI or others to whom RBI sells them. As such, in a consolidated balance sheet of the government and RBI, liabilities are unaffected by the swap, and the asset side is larger by the amount of the foreign gift. If the RBI did not sterilize its newly created money, its non-interest bearing currency liabilities would go up by the value of foreign gift it buys. In a consolidation, non-interest bearing liabilities and assets go up by the same amount.
Leaving aside the sources of fiscal deficit, its financing by monetization adds to noninterest bearing liabilities of the government, while bond-financing adds to its interest bearing liabilities. But there is no change in assets, as in the case of a foreign gift. However, by assuming that fiscal deficit results in an increase in the current account deficit, which is financed by a reduction in foreign currency reserves in the case of its monetization, LBP in effect reduce the money supply, thus swapping what otherwise would have been an increase in domestic liabilities to an equivalent decrease in foreign assets. On the other hand, if the private savingsinvestment balance shifts to accommodate the fiscal deficit, this swap need not occur. In any case, since there is no net addition to assets regardless of the mode of financing the fiscal deficit, comparison of financing deficits with sterilization or otherwise of capital inflow is inappropriate.
Bond financing leads to crowding out of private investment in the LBP analysis, while monetization of deficits does not. This is presumably because in the latter case, the assumed mode of adjustment to fiscal deficits is a fall in reserves and not in the private savingsinvestment balance, whereas in the former case, it is the private savings-investment balance that adjusts. Hence, the growth effects of alternative ways of financing differ because of this assumption. In the case of capital inflows, the growth or welfare effects differ depending on whether the inflow is absorbed or not, and not from whether it was sterilized.
In any case, the issue of absorption of capital inflow is, in principle, separable from the issue of sterilization. Absorption involves the use of the additional resources from the inflow for financing additional imports. In the real model, in the case in which the government "buys" the inflow through a tax transfer and "stores" it, no additional imports come in. But, if instead one were to assume that the government uses the inflow it bought for public consumption, and if the government's utility function were the same as that of the private sector, the equilibrium would be the same as if the government did not buy the inflows. Going beyond the model, the government's prepayment of part of its external debt from reserves can be viewed as absorption:
instead of absorbing it so as to raise domestic investment (i.e., increase domestic assets regardless of whether they are privately or publicly owned), it reduced its external debt. If the return on domestic investment is no higher than that on foreign debt, such absorption is appropriate.
Growth, Investment and Deficits
In this section, we illustrate the analytics of fiscal deficits and their financing, crowding out, savings and investment through a series of four growth models. Unlike the static model considered in Section 2, there is no money in these models. This allows us to focus on the growth and deficit implications of different assumptions on savings and investment behavior. The central point is that growth and government deficits are both determined endogenously by more fundamental assumptions on savings and investment behavior. It is precisely such features that are absent from models such as those of van Wijnbergen (1991) and Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2001) , 11 which consider intertemporal consumption and foreign borrowing, but without any role for either private or public investment. This modeling strategy appears to be quite common, allowing consideration of some implications of fiscal deficits, but not those highlighted in our models.
Model I
This is a Harrod-Domar model with firms, households and government. Subscripts used are 'g' for 'government', 'p' for private sector', and 'h' for 'households'. Only households save, while the private sector and government both invest. The behavioral equations and equilibrium are quite simple. Y stands for GDP, and there is no interest rate. Savings are a constant fraction of GDP, and the sign and magnitude of λ in the private investment demand equation reflect 11 See footnote 7 for a brief discussion of these two papers.
whether, and the extent to which, public investment crowds in or crowds out private investment. 
and
We assume that s h -µ > 0, or the marginal propensity to save out of income exceeds the private marginal propensity to invest. This ensures that government investment is positive in the above equilibrium. Note that here government investment passively soaks up savings not absorbed by the private sector.
Output is given by
Hence, the equilibrium growth rate is
Finally,
As long as β p > β g , and given s h -µ > 0, the last expression is positive, as one would expect. In fact, as λ → ∞, I g → 0 and g → β p s h , which is the maximal growth rate.
To relate this model to the issue of crowding out effects of fiscal deficits, note that the government deficit in the model is given by
where T is tax revenue, and is simply a transfer from households to the government. If T = 0, then the deficit is simply the government's investment. In that case, equation (3.5) is also the government deficit in equilibrium. Both the deficit and the growth rate are determined
endogenously, and what is relevant for determining their correlation is the movement of the underlying parameters. Thus, an increase in λ reduces the deficit, but increases the growth rate.
On the other hand, an increase in increases private and public investment and, hence, the growth rate in equilibrium. However, since public investment is the same as the deficit, an increase in increases the deficit. Furthermore, we can assume that tax revenue has some buoyancy with respect to income: this is captured by the parameter b, so that T = bY. Our savings equation is modified as follows.
Thus, the parameter s h is simply replaced by s h ′ in the remaining equations of the model. In this case, an increase in taxation, through an increase in b, simply reduces growth, because it reduces savings. At the same time, the equilibrium deficit is now given by
Thus, the equilibrium deficit and the growth rate both decrease as b increases.
Model II
The above model lacks an interest rate mechanism for equilibrating savings and investment. Equilibrium is achieved through adjustments in government investment.
Government investment expenditure crowds in through a technological assumption (λ > 0), but there is no crowding out. Our second model is essentially a modification of the first that introduces the interest rate, and hence the possibility of endogenous crowding out. We allow somewhat more general functional forms. Hence, the growth rate is
In this case, we see that the growth implications of an increase in government investment are ambiguous, and depend on the relative efficiency of public and private investment, and the responses of savings and investment to interest rates, as well as the magnitude of any crowding in. Note that taxation in this model may now reduce crowding out, by reducing the government's net demand for investment funds. This is in addition to the previous effect of reducing savings.
This adds another complication to the impact of government investment on growth.
Model III
We extend the previous approach by allowing for optimal savings and taxation, using a neoclassical model with two types of capital (public and private). This allows for a richer analysis. The labor force grows exogenously at the rate n, and the production function exhibits constant returns to scale. Public investment in this model is financed entirely by capital taxation, so there is no deficit: debt financing is considered in the next model.
The social planner maximizes 
with respect to the control variable c and τ, we have the first order conditions 
The equations of motion for the costate variables λ and µ are:
If λ µ = during any interval of time, then λ µ
Thus we derive the optimal investment and consumption paths, as well as the associated optimal tax rate for financing public investment. As is the case with neoclassical optimal growth models of this genre, the steady state levels of consumption, outputs, capital-labor ratios and the tax rates depend only on the pure rate of time preference and the rate of growth of the labor force. Preferences and initial capital stocks matter only along the transition to the steady state.
Model IV
In this case, Model III is altered by replacing tax finance with debt finance. The steady state results are very similar, as one might expect. We will abbreviate the notation slightly where it is obvious. Here d is the debt stock of the government per worker, r is the interest rate on debt, and − is debt service (i.e., interest due on existing debt ( rd ) s minus any gross additions to debt per worker or equivalently, d nd + & plus any gross repayment of debt per worker.
The equations of motion are
Once again, maximizing the current value Hamiltonian normalization that world prices of all commodities are unity, the addition of (3.14) and (3.15)
implies that trade is balanced so that there is no international borrowing or lending. Model IV differs from Model III is that international borrowing or lending at the world interest rate r is allowed.
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Model IV could also be used to illustrate the implications of a gift z (in terms of world numéraire per worker per instant) to the private sector of the economy. 14 Assume that z is received either for a finite period 0 (Case A) or permanently, i.e., for all (Case B).
In effect, the gift adds z to the value of output per worker, i.e.,
f k k at world prices. Thus (3.25) is changed to:
13 To see this, suppose that all borrowing is from abroad. Now s is net receipts (new borrowing minus interest payments) from abroad, calculated per worker. Let m be the value of imports per worker and x be the value of exports per worker, both at world prices. Then gdp + imports ≡ consumption +investment + exports or: ( ) s = = 14 In the context of macroeconomic policy for India, the gift can be interpreted as remittances from abroad.
( , )
for 0 in Case A and for all in Case B. The other constraints, (3.26) and (3.27), remain the same. 
Clearly, such a choice is not optimal: were it to be optimal, a path for the costate variable has to satisfy its equation of motion Since such a policy is feasible, an optimal policy will yield a higher intertemporal welfare. Thus, a policy of keeping along their path of the case z=0 for and adding the gift entirely to consumption is not optimal and yields a lower welfare.
Consider an alternative policy of reducing debt accumulation, taxing away the reduction in debt service (i.e., prepayment of debt), and using the tax receipts for replacing debt-financed accumulation of public debt. That is, let:
where τ is the lump sum tax per worker.
It is obvious that c c
and hence, such a policy is feasible (for sufficiently small τ so that ). Once again, it is not optimal so that using the gift to reduce debt service yields lower intertemporal welfare than an optimal policy. It follows that 
Conclusion
In this paper, we have argued that, in order to understand some of the puzzles in India's current macroeconomic situation, a coherent intertemporal model is required, in which both private and public savings and investment behavior are behaviorally specified, and growth, government deficits, and other macroeconomic variables are determined in equilibrium. We have also argued that if money is included in the model, which is required if one wishes to examine issues connected to sterilization of foreign inflows, it must be incorporated in a manner that recognizes interactions with the real side.
We have illustrated the importance of coherent intertemporal modeling, as well as properly incorporating money, in separate illustrative models. Our goal has been to provide some starting points for further theoretical analysis, which could then be used for empirical work that could have policy relevance. Since much of the policy debate on India's fiscal deficits, exchange rate management policy, and reserves management policy is either model-free, or uses ad hoc models, we believe that even our simple, illustrative models have some value in guiding future academic and policy discussion of India's macroeconomic situation. In this respect, we are in agreement with the approach of Joshi and Sanyal (2004) , who use a Mundell-Fleming model to provide an analytical basis for assessing India's current macroeconomic situation and policy responses. Since the focus of the Mundell-Fleming model is on short run equilibria in goods, money and foreign exchange markets, our main focus on intertemporal models and growth can be seen as a complement to Joshi and Sanyal's work, though we overlap in our treatment of several analytical and policy issues. A third and last problem is that although the models are meant to illustrate the choice among alternative government policies of sterilization, bond financing and monetization, etc., LBP do not specify a government objective function describing the trade off among different consequences (i.e., inflation, crowding out, growth) of alternative policy choices. This is understandable given the fact government objective functions specified in various political economy models of the literature are crude!
Turning to the Australian model, there is a relatively minor error in the discussion by LBP of the model and its illustration in their Figure I . 15 As long as there is a non-zero tax or subsidy on traded goods, their domestic prices and world prices would differ, and the consumption point will not be on the production possibility frontier, since consumption expenditures would differ from the value of output by the net revenue from trade taxes or subsidies, LBP do not allow for this fact. 16 We do so in our Figure 
P P ′
15 As we note in the introduction, this error does not affect the value of the policy discussion in LBP. 16 Also, they depict the capital inflow as a parallel shift in the budget line, thus measuring it in units of domestic price based composite of traded goods. This does not square with the balance of trade constraint that the inflow enables the economy to finance more imports at world prices than it earns from its exports, again at world prices. imports so that supply point shifts to . However, if the tariff rate remains unchanged, the relative price of importable will not change, and if preferences are homothetic, the demand point will move on the ray from the origin connecting it to . Thus, comparing with , there is an excess demand for non-tradables and an excess supply of non-tradables. With the tariff rate remaining at t , for bringing about an equilibrium, the relative price of non-tradables has to increase, so that both the export and import real exchange rates appreciate by the same proportion. Clearly, consumer welfare at the new equilibrium will be higher than at the initial equilibrium, assuming that both goods are normal in consumption. This is the case, to use the LBP We noted earlier that in the real model there can be no analogue of sterilization of the monetary impact of the gift through an open market operation using nominal bonds. However, the model is eminently suitable for analyzing policies relating to the absorption of the gift. For example, the government can prevent its absorption by imposing real taxation, as LBP recognize.
Imagine that the government, instead of returning tariff revenue in a lump fashion to consumers, uses a part of it to buy at the initial domestic price of imports, which is in fact their opportunity cost to consumers (if the cost of exceeds tariff revenue, the balance is made up by lump sum taxation). The net effects of this operation are two (i) the government acquires , which is no longer available to buy imports (ii) consumers on the one hand receive ( from their sale of to government, but lose a part of the lump sum transfers they originally received or all of it and pay additional lump sum taxes. But, and this is the important point, this operation of tax-transfer leaves consumers at their original expenditure line
E E′ so that they consume at . Thus, government gets (and adds it on to reserves) and production, consumption as well as relative prices remain at their initial equilibrium values. It is evident that in this static real model, not allowing the external gift to be absorbed has the effect of keeping welfare at its initial level and not letting it rise.
0
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While the Australian model focuses on the role of real exchange rates as an equilibrating variable, these rates are strictly not necessary for a discussion of the welfare implications of absorption. For this purpose, the conventional two traded goods model will do. However, in such a model, the relative price of importable in terms of exportable does not change whether or not the gift is absorbed. The reason is that, for a small open economy, the world relative price is given and does not change, and the domestic relative price does not change either, given the unchanged tariff. Thus, in Figure 2 , the initial production point is at where the domestic tariff inclusive relative price line . A gift shifts supply at unchanged domestic prices to and demand to (given homothetic tastes) where and are on the world price lines , which is parallel to . This is the case of full absorption. Welfare at is higher than at . The government can prevent absorption by using all, as in the earlier case, or part of tariff revenue and any additional lump sum taxes to buy at domestic prices, leaving consumers at the initial equilibrium . Once again, preventing absorption precludes a rise in welfare. assuming, for illustrative purposes, that the part of capital inflow that is allowed to be absorbed in any year will be added to investment that year and hence raise the capital stock the next year.
This is somewhat puzzling-if the consumer's budget line is shifted by the full value of inflow absorbed, as LBP seem to be doing in their Figure 1 , there cannot be any increase in investment due to the absorbed inflow. In any case, their assumption does not allow the differences in the time path of the real exchange rates (depending on whether inflows are being sterilized) to influence consumption and investment decisions. Appendix II (A) the wage rate enters the supply equation for non-tradables but not the rental rate for capital. In a two commodity model with inelastically supplied factors, it is enough to have relative commodity prices and aggregate factor endowments in the supply equations. But LBP do not take that route. In any case, unless some restrictions are placed on the parameters , .
. . b , b . . . equations A1 to A7 would not be mutually consistent. Finally, in equation A1 for the demand for non-traded goods, money supply relative to money demand appears. It is hard to see the reason why it appears only in the demand for non-traded good. Again, since LBP seem to combine a real and monetary model without integrating them and it is also hard to see how the extent of crowding out of private investment was estimated, we cannot evaluate whether the illustrative numbers follow from a logically coherent set up. In addition to these points, we note that Joshi and Sanyal (2004) have argued that the LBP method for estimating forgone investment is logically flawed. Thus, even though the authors stress that their empirical exercise is only illustrative, it may be somewhat misleading overall. 
Eliminating T using (3) in (1) we get:
In per worker terms, these can be written as: 
